THE
DEMILITARIZED
ZONE
한반도 비무장지대
Redrawing the Border between North and South Korea beyond Tourism
Harvard University
Graduate School of Design
Penny White Award, May 2011
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THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ) is the buffer zone between North and South Korea.
한반도 비무장지대
Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 907Km²
Established on July 27, 1953 with the armistice agreement.

Militar Demarcation Line (MDL)
1,292 signs like the ones on page 48 and 49, written in Chinese and Korean on the north, English and Korean on the south, are placed every 300~500m which forms the MDL.

Civilian Control Area (CCA) 1,528Km²
Established by the 8th US Army Corps in Feb 1954

Civilian Control Line (CCL)

Border Region, also branded "Peace & Life Zone" (PLZ) by the Korean Tourism Organization
http://english.visitkorea.or.kr

Special Military Region
Areas that are 50km from the border line is designated as "Special Military Region" on the north side of the border.

Kaesong Industrial Region
To Pyongyang, capital of North Korea 205 Km from Dorasan Station near DMZ.

The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides whenever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank controlled by the other side. (Ref to Article 1, point 5 pg 129)

Seoul, capital of South Korea 56 km from Dorasan Station near DMZ. One hour drive.
THE DMZ WAS ESTABLISHED ON JULY 27, 1953 WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
THE DMZ HAS BEEN PROTECTED FROM URBANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT FOR ALMOST 60 YEARS.
THE AREA OF THE DMZ IS 907Km². ACCOUNTING FOR 0.5% OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IT HAS 150% THE AREA OF SEOUL AND 33% THAT OF PYONGYANG.
THE DMZ IS HOME TO ENDANGERED ASIAN CRANES, BLACK-FACED SPOONBILLs, ANGORA GOATS, AMUR LEOPARDS, AND BEARS. ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS "DMZ FORUM" ARE AIMING TO HAVE THE DMZ PROCLAIMED A UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE SITE.
THE DMZ IS NOT FREE FROM HUMAN EXPLOITATION. NASA SATELLITE IMAGERY HAS REVEALED MULTIPLE BURN SCARS IN THE AREA RELATED TO MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS.
ACCORDING TO “CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION” REPORT, THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 2.2 MILLION LAND MINES WITHIN AND ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DMZ.
BACKGROUND
한반도 비무장지대
THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Introduction

Long before the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) and before the DMZ was established as a result of the Korean War (June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953), the 38th parallel was discussed as a proposed line for delimiting Russian and Japanese influence in the peninsula in the late 19th century. Polarized political ideologies in Korea following its independence from Japanese colonization caused the Korean War, one of the first proxy wars between superpowers.

The ideological contestation between communist powers China and the Soviet Union, and the free world led by the U.S. left behind the demilitarized zone (DMZ), 250 Km (160 miles) long and 4 Km (2.5 miles) wide, that is 907 km2 (224,125 acres). This area accounts for about 0.5% of the Korean peninsula. To this day the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) runs through the center of DMZ and divides the communist North from the capitalist South. Technically, the two Koreas are still at war, and are only under a temporary armistice that was signed in 1953.

Given the DMZ’s relative freedom from human intervention in the past 60 years, it has become one of the most bio-diverse areas in Korea, perhaps in the world. Starting in the early 2000s, many calls and proposals have been made to conserve and preserve the area as a national or international peace park. The DMZ is however not free from other depredations: according to the United Nations Environment Programme report, for example, multiple burn scars linked to military surveillance operations in DMZ have been revealed through NASA’s Landsat 7 satellite. Furthermore, several organized DMZ tourist operations offer limited access to it on the South Korean side.

Beyond existing history, security concerns, and ecologically themed tourism and other moneymaking ventures, what more can the DMZ become? What Can it do? Can it be a more productive landscape, harness energy or become a cultural asset that creates value for North and South Korea? Alike, can it foster collaboration between the two Koreas? Or to put it differently: what should it not be? Ultimately, elaborate mapping of the DMZ and its surrounding environment through the lens of current touristic operations can be used to provoke thoughts and envision the DMZ’s alternate future, speculating its potential transformation to an asset from a barrier.
Research Background

This study is an attempt to better understand the DMZ beyond the political border, physical barrier, military buffer, and container of biodiversity, and understand its complex spatial operations. After the Korean War, the “38th parallel line” became more fixed in a different form. How and who drew the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) that makes up the DMZ? Why was it constructed? How is it maintained?

With these questions in mind, this Penny White award study focused its investigation on the current tourism industry flourishing around the DMZ on the South Korean side, and how we can start to read it in a more productive and meaningful way.

What kind of touristic operations are taking place? How do they impact the contiguous 4.8 to 20 Km (3 to 12 miles) wide Civilian Control Area (CCA)? What do the estimated 1.2 million land mines on the South Korean side represent to these touristic operations, and the future of these territories and especially their settlement patterns?
More than 100,000 tourists have passed through the joint security area (JSA) on strictly organized tours. Many of these tourists are Japanese, Chinese, American and European. Typically, South Koreans are not allowed on the JSA tours for security reasons. However, almost 4 million visitors including South Koreans visit the Imjin Pyungwha Nuri park (meaning Peace World park, see pg.115) near the DMZ in Paju annually.
Juxtapositions and contradictions set the tone for the borderlands. Deceptively smooth expressways run continuously parallel to enclosures. Being psychologically aware that these expressways terminate abruptly somewhere, slows one down with anxiety before one physically arrives at any terminus.

FREEDOM EXPRESSWAY

This ironically named expressway connects the capital city of Seoul to Paju City, near the DMZ. It is one of the most heavily traveled expressways in South Korea, with an average daily traffic volume of 270,000 vehicles in 2010.

The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) conference building is located within the Joint Security area in the middle of the DMZ. Talks between North and South Korean officials are held here. The building is theoretically divided into two, North and South, but both take turns in sharing the building.

(Refer to "appendices," pg 139, for further details on the function of the UNCMC.)
"The Bridge of No Return" crosses over the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) between North and South Korea. It is located in the JSA and was last used as a checkpoint for the exchange of prisoners of war. Upon release, they had to decide which side to join, and was never allowed to cross back. It was also where the U.S. Pueblo crew crossed over upon their release in December 23, 1968. This bridge made such a deep imprint on the Korean imaginary that it became the setting for a famous Korean movie titled “JSA.”
파주시 조산리 대성동 "자유 마을"

**DAESUNG-DONG**

"FREEDOM VILLAGE"

This is the only South Korean Village within the DMZ. Only the original residents and their direct descendants are allowed to reside there. The 50 families who live there, comprising 200 people boast an average household income of US$70,000. They have exclusive access to agricultural lands with tax exemptions. Male residents are also exempt from military duty. Access in and out of the “Freedom” village is highly restricted for both inhabitants and visitors. They also are subject to a midnight curfew.

개성시 평화리 기정동 "평화촌"

**KIJONG-DONG**

"PEACE VILLAGE"

Widely known to South Koreans and Westerners alike as a “propaganda village,” it is one of two villages within the DMZ that was allowed to stay in place following the Armistice Agreement. The 160m (524ft) tall flagpole, until recently the tallest in the world, was a response to the 85m (279ft) flagpole South Koreans built in Daesung “Freedom Village” on the South side in 1980. According to the tour guides, the Peace Village is a ghost town, with no night lights. Only military personnel is ever seen.
This tunnel was discovered in October of 1978. It is one of four infiltration tunnels known to the public. The location of the 1635m-long tunnel is about 44km, less than a hour's drive, from Seoul. It has become a popular “security tour” site attracting many foreign tourists, Korean soldiers, and students.
Dorasan station is the northernmost railway station in South Korea. It is part of the Gyeongui line and was opened in 2002 after being disconnected for 52 years. In 2007 goods from South Korea were shipped to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. However, operations were halted after the North Koreans closed the border crossing when a South Korean conservative government was elected in 2008.

Former South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung and his U.S. counterpart George W. Bush signed the railroad ties at Dorasan Station, wishing for peace and unification. During his visit to the DMZ in 1993, former U.S president Bill Clinton described it as being the “scariest place on Earth.”
EULJI OBSERVATORY

The observatory is located 1,049m (3,442ft) above sea level. Like many other military installations within the CCA, it is only accessible after a security check-in. Young military personnel give a detailed security briefing once the tourists arrive at the observatory. Many Guard Posts (G.P) of North and South Korea can be seen from the observatory, but no photography is allowed.

PUNCH BOWL

This land formation is called the “Punch Bowl” because it resembles a large bowl. It was the site of fierce battles during the Korean War. Many dreadful battles were fought along the border to secure strategic advantages. Most of the three-year long Korean War was fought near these territories.
FOURTH INFRINGEMENT TUNNEL

The fourth and last officially discovered infiltration tunnel was discovered on March 3, 1990. It was unique in that it was the first one to be found in the eastern region of the border. The 1.7 x 1.7m (5’6”x 5’6”) tunnel was found 145m (475ft) below ground. It is identical in construction to the second and third infiltration tunnels.
**WARNINGS**

More rules: from the reverse side of the tour ticket

1. No stopping or leaving the vehicle except at designated points
2. Follow the instructions of the guides and military personnel
3. Drinking, singing, and dancing is not permitted
4. Photographing of military installations or during transportation is not permitted
5. No firearms, video recorders, zoom lens cameras, alcohol, nor fishing equipment are permitted
6. We are not civilly nor penally responsible for personal and property damage due to unexpected accidents (Gunnshots, explosions, vehicular accidents).

* You will be referred to relevant legislation should you not comply with the above.

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**CHEORWON**

Tours leave four times a day, taking a three hour trip to the Goseokjeong Pavilion, the second infiltration tunnel, the peace observatory, Woljeongri Railway Station, and the old Labour Party building. The tour thus combines natural, historical and security sites. As opposed to the Joint Security Area, which is mainly restricted to foreigners, this tour is open and accessible to South Koreans. It is however, limited to the CCA and does not take visitors into the DMZ itself.
Many locations within the CCA and near the DMZ are not displayed by South Korean GPS equipment for security reasons. However, with increased internet access and GPS positioning technology enabled through widespread smartphones, your location is pinpointed on Google or Bing maps. This security measure then starts to erode.
UNIFICATION OBSERVATORY

Since its opening in 1984, more than 28 million people have visited the observatory. That equivalent to 1 million visitors per year, who have a spectacular view of the East Sea and the famous Mount Keumkang on the North side. Many separated families visit the observatory on special occasions to be closer to their families in North Korea.

MT. KEUMKANG TOURS

After a 45-year disconnect, South Korean tourists were able to travel to Mount Keumkang first by cruise ships and as of 2003, on the newly connected roads by bus. By late 2008, more than 1.95 million people had travelled to Mount Keumkang. Tours came to a full stop when a South Korean tourist was shot dead by a North Korean soldier in July, 2008.
TYPOLOGIES
MILITARY BASE CAMPS NEAR THE DMZ IN SOUTH KOREA

Although DMZ stands for “Demilitarized Zone,” this border is amongst the most militarized and fortified in the world, with North Korea having more than 1.1 million active troops and 8.3 million reserve and South Korea having 0.69 million active troops and 8.0 million in reserve, mostly concentrated near the DMZ. The United States also have 28,500 active troops stationed in South Korea.
Warning and restriction signs mark the landscape of the DMZ and its surrounding territories. They not only serve as reminders of where one is, but change how one perceives the surrounding landscape and its built environment. The effect is that of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon: one feels as if one were being watched all the time. It makes one question oneself before taking any photo or moving freely.
“He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection”

The normal primary connective function of the road is perceived in the DMZ as a weak defense. This inherent weakness is countered by “North Korean speed bumps” known as the “rock drops.” The intension of which is to slow down an eventual land invasion by exploding huge concrete blocks down on to the road. Installed mostly in 1979-80, the system is now seen as obsolete. Nevertheless, they are still in place which activates the latent memory and probabilities of war.
BORDER LANDSCAPES

Spanning 250 km laterally from its west to east coast, the DMZ frames a variety of ecological zones and landscapes. Its absence of urbanization has sparked nature conservation groups such as “The DMZ Forum: for Peace and Nature Conservation” to preserve and protect its unique biological and cultural resources. Their goal is to have the DMZ designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Research and awareness is also ongoing in the area, seeking ways to support ecotourism and other activities compatible with the region’s ecology.
“Borders, then, are rather strange hybrid entities: they are irreal [sic] as discursively constructed, but they can be embodied in physical things like walls. In contrast with boundaries and borderlands, but in common with border-lines, borders are ideal and eidetic; they are constituted by words (typically written, though these are sometimes based on official oral discussions: in both cases, their meanings are irreal [sic] as semantic entities), or by images (as with border-lines considered as drawn features in the maps that depict them).”

Casey, E. S. “Border versus Boundary at La Frontera”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2011, Volume 29, pg 390
IMAGES OF HOPE

Cast against frightful tensions and a dark history of war, images of hope, and reconciliation are cropping up along the DMZ tour routes. They are often emotional calls for reunification, humanitarian empathy, economic improvements, and other messages of peace. A sign installed by the Ministry of Unification of South Korea in Dorasan Station, near the DMZ reads: “Not the last station from the South, but the first station toward the North.” But who are the people yearning for unification? The separated families? Who else does it matter to? Who would benefit from it? Who wouldn’t? Is reunification inevitable? Will the current situation perpetuate itself? How can positive change be jumpstarted?
“The only certain thing about war is uncertainty.”

Kim Byungki, International Relations Professor at Korea University

South Korea’s Overpasses to Nowhere Remain Part of Defense Strategy by Jon Rabiroff
ROAD TO THE DMZ, ALONG THE IMJIN RIVER
MILITARY BORDER FENCES ALONG THE IMJIN RIVER
SERIES OF TUNNELS TRAVELING EAST
THE FOURTH INFILTRATION TUNNEL
EAST COAST LOOKING SOUTH NEAR THE DMZ
HISTORY OF THE DMZ

Long before the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) and before the DMZ was established as a result of the Korean War (June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953), the 38th parallel was discussed as a proposed line for delimiting Russian and Japanese influence in the peninsula in the late 19th century. Polarized political ideologies in Korea following its independence from Japanese colonization caused the Korean War, one of the first proxy wars between superpowers.

The ideological contestation between communist powers China and the Soviet Union, and the free world led by the U.S. left behind the demilitarized zone (DMZ), 250 Km (160 miles) long and 4 Km (2.5 miles) wide, that is 907 km² (224,125 acres). This area accounts for about 0.5% of the Korean peninsula. To this day the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) runs through the center of DMZ and divides the communist North from the capitalist South. Technically, the two Koreas are still at war, and are only under a temporary armistice that was signed in 1953.

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THE DMZ AS A BARRIER

Beyond the barbed-wired fence as physical barrier, the DMZ is one of the most heavily militarized borders in the world. North Korea has 1.1 million active and 8.2 million reserve troops (418.9 / 1,000 capita), South Korea 687,000 active and 8.0 million reserve (173.6 / 1,000 capita; comparable to 103.6 / 1,000 of Israel). U.S Forces also has 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea with most of them concentrated around the DMZ.

According to various sources, there are 2.2 million land mines are spread around the DMZ. This equates to about 1.2 mines per square meter. (Center for Defense Information report, see pag 26)

Many sections along the DMZ also have anti-tank barriers on the roads. North Korea accuses South Korea of building a concrete wall “5-8m high, 10-19m thick at the bottom, and 3-7m wide in the upper part” spanning the entire length of the DMZ with gun embrasures, lookouts, and military establishments. South Korea and the U.S. denies of any installments existing.

Recently, in July 2010, South Korea installed two robots worth US$ 360,000 each, capable of detecting and killing intruders along the DMZ (July, 2010, "The Telegraph"). This can be seen as a countermeasure to the four North Korean infiltration tunnels discovered between 1974 and 1990. Capable of carrying up to 30,000 troops per hour, they are not just a physical intrusion, but is a psychological and symbolic barrier between both countries.

This disputed sea area is also known for its crab catching. Two or three tons of crabs can be worth as much as US$ 70,000. Peak season is short, typically from early May to mid July. South Korea takes about one third of the catch, about 3,300 tons. North Korea on the other hand, exported 1,879 tons of crab, worth $7.8 million to China in 2001, and similar amounts to Japan. These maritime disputes have already resulted in many fatal clashes between the parties.

Amongst the recent military clashes was the first Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999. Four North Korean patrol boats and a group of fishing boats crossed the border starting a gun battle. Which resulted in one boat damaged, 30 North Korean sailors killed, and 70 wounded. In the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2000, two North Korean vessel sinking, five patrol boats damaged, 30 North Korean sailors killed, and 70 wounded. In the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2000, two North Korean vessels crossed the NLL near Daecheong Island and started firing; after being outnumbered and suffering damage, the vessels retreated. In 2009's Battle of Daecheong, a North Korean gunboat crossed the NLL and entered waters near Daecheong Island, and was heavily damaged from counterattack, as a result they retreated.

A major blow to South Korea was the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010. The Cheonan, a South Korean corvette, was sunk by an explosion, killing 46 South Korean sailors. This result in a South Korea-led international investigation that uncovered North Korea's involvement, which the North continues to deny. The shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010 was the most recent incidents in the west border water zone. North Korean forces fired causing widespread damage to the civilian fishing village.

A map of the DMZ showing key locations and events.
Although the DMZ operates as a physical and mental barrier, it can be porous for certain flows and connections, notably those in the natural ecologies. Serral rivers, and streams flows across it. Recently, the Imjin River came under scrutiny when the an un-notified North Korean dam discharge killed 3 and swept away 6 South Koreans in September, 2009. Since there was no significant rain around the time of the release, this was seen as a provocation. I(.September 2009, “The New York Times”). This use of watercourse and dams as weapons or aggressive offense is not new. In 1986, it was revealed that North Korea was building a massive dam upstream of the Han River, which flows through Seoul, the capital of South Korea. This lead to the South Korean government to build the “Peace Dam” further down stream, an effort to which virtually every South Korean contributed though taxes and public donations in order to capture the water flowing from the North and protecting Seoul. It was later revealed that the South Korean government’s claims of North’s water aggression was exaggerated to maintain their power.

Since the late 1990s, with a left-leaning North Korean friendly South Korean government, the “Sunshine Policy” implemented an unprecedented level of economic and infrastructural connections until the death of a South Korean tourist in July 2008. In 1998, the South Korean Hyundai Group was permitted to develop the resort at Mt. Kumgang in North Korea, which played a significant role in reducing tensions between both countries. The Mt. Kumgang tourism project was an effort to promote peaceful relations and reunification (Ministry of Unification, 2006). On 11 August, 1998, the cruise ship Kumgangho sailed on its maiden voyage from Donghae Harbor in the South to North Korea, carrying 826 passengers, marking the historic start of the Mt Kumgang tour (Ministry of Unification, 2007).

In February 2003, an inland tour to Mt. Kumgang set out by passing through the DMZ. This route provided more convenient access than sailing from Donghae Harbor. Since then, in addition to 400,000 tourists in 2007, almost two million South Koreans have visited Mt. Kumgang since its opening in 1998 (Ministry of Unification, 2008). In December 2007, a second agreement between the Hyundai Group and North Korea started the Kaesong City tour, a one-day, closely controlled tour that explores the historic and cultural legacy of Kaesong (Choi, 2007). While the past decade witnessed positive movements in inter-Korean relations regarding tourism and business developments, tensions reemerged as the result of a North Korean soldier shooting a South Korean tourist near the Mt. Kumgang resort while she was taking a walk in July 2008. North Korea refused the South’s request for a joint investigation of the death, and South Korea suspended all tours to the resort (BBC, 2008).

Parallel to this, the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea was established in 2002. This industrial park opened in December 2004. Just 10 Km (6 miles) north of the DMZ, it seeks synergies between the highly productive yet cheap, labor of North Korea and the technological know-how and capital of the South. Workers earn $75 a month, half of Chinese and 5% of what the South Korean counterparts earn. The operation started in March 2005, and as of June 2010 employs 42,000 North Koreans and 800 South Koreans. Future plans are to hire 26,000 additional workers and to increase the power supply from its current 15 MW to 100MW, transmitted from the South.

In addition to government collaborations and flows, there are natural ecological flows, such as migratory birds, and other floras and faunas that are flourishing in the DMZ due to lack of human intervention. The DMZ has become an involuntary wildlife park that is now recognized as one of the best preserved temperate habitats in the world. This has driven many environmentalists to push to transform the DMZ into an eco-peace park or a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Despite North Korea’s jamming of radio and television signals, and no more than 3GB thumb drives circulate with programmed 3GB thumb drives, these operations are trying to deceive their public, and that they would target and retaliate the areas where these balloons were deployed.

**FLOWS IN THE DMZ**

- **South Korean tourist shot dead July 2008**
- **2 million South Korean tourists visit Mt Kumkang**
- **Arrives in Pyongyang after 3~4 hours of launching from Sokcho in DMZ**
- **2~3 hours of floating leaving South of DMZ**
- **4-5m/s**
- **Speeds of 4-5m/s**
- **38˚37’ N  123˚45’ E**
- **38˚30’ N  122˚40’ E**
- **38˚37’ N  123˚45’ E**
- **38˚30’ N  122˚40’ E**
- **38˚37’ N  123˚45’ E**
- **38˚30’ N  122˚40’ E**
- **N, 125° 44’ E  10”**
- **N, 126° 33’ E  0”**
- **N, 125° 44’ E  10”**
- **N, 126° 33’ E  0”**
- **N, 125° 44’ E  10”**
MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA
AND
TEMPORARY SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

Text of Agreement
ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map (Map 1). [1]

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).[2]

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map (Map 2).[3] Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

[1] The originals of these maps, large-scale in size, are deposited with the signed original Agreement in the archives of the Department of State where they are available for reference.
8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as
directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistic Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistic Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistic Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands", as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°55'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. *(See Map 3.)*

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistic Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea...

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1 See footnote 1, ante, p. 237.
for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of

entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (See Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

1 See footnote 1, ante, p. 237.
17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PAMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.
e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as
may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term “neutral nations” as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and
equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command</th>
<th>Territory under the military control of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCHON (37°28′N, 126°38′E)</td>
<td>SINDULI (40°06′N, 124°24′E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAEJU (35°52′N, 128°36′E)</td>
<td>CHONGJIN (41°46′N, 129°49′E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUSAN (35°06′N, 129°02′E)</td>
<td>HUNGNAM (39°50′N, 127°37′E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANGNUNG (37°45′N, 128°54′E)</td>
<td>MANGPO (41°09′N, 126°18′E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNSAN (35°59′N, 126°43′E)</td>
<td>SINDANJU (39°36′N, 125°36′E)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).-7

3 See footnote 1, ante, p. 237.
3. GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to ensure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

ARTICLE III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.
b. Each shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purpose of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, "송환" (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and "還返" (CHIEN FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives
of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

1. One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

2. One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

3. One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

4. In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

5. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

6. Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 59a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This
Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

2. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

3. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

ARTICLE IV
RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.
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Dongsei is a registered architect and urban designer with more than seven years of professional experience in New York, Seoul, and Wellington. He is currently expanding his research in urbanism at Harvard University through the Advanced Studies Program, working towards a Master in Design Studies (MDesS), Urbanism, Landscape, Ecology.

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